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.S. companies are increasingly requiring their
consumers and employees, whom I refer to here
as "little guys," to arbitrate rather than litigate
disputes with the company. With envelope stuffers, com-
puterized click-through agreements, or just small print,
companies can eliminate "little guys' " opportunity to liti-
gate, even if the "little guys" did not knowingly or intelli-
gently agree, and even if they never signed the provision.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the 1925
Federal Arbitration Act requires that courts enforce such
"agreements," called "mandatory" binding arbitration by
their critics. Although such clauses usually affect poten-
tial plaintiffs, sometimes they also affect "little guys" as
defendants. Credit card companies are increasingly using
mandatory arbitration clauses to bring collection actions
against their customers in arbitration rather than in court.
Pointing to the often inaccessible litigation system,
some argue that consumers are better off in mandatory
arbitration than in litigation. Defenders assert that most
arbitrators are fair, that the purportedly cheaper process
will keep wages higher and prices lower, and that empirical
studies prove mandatory arbitration is better than litiga-
tion. Some even contend that mandatory arbitration is
necessary to protect companies from "predatory"litigation
by consumers or employees.
But empirical studies don't resolve this dispute. Few have
been done, as arbitration providers are unwilling to provide
open access to their files. Moreover, to the extent studies
look only at who prevails in an arbitration hearing, they miss
most of the empirical picture. Much of mandatory arbitra-
tion's impact is that it deters people from bringing claims at
all and causes them to settle on unfavorable terms.
Defenders of mandatory arbitration play a rhetorical
game when they suggest critics should have the burden
of proving the practice is unfair, instead of requiring
defenders to prove the practice is fair. Yet, without defini-
tive proof either way, we know that companies have an
incentive to eke out every advantage in battles against
consumers and employees. Companies want to prevent
"little guys" from bringing claims against the company
and then want to maximize companies' opportunities to
prevail if claims are brought. When courts enforce "agree-
ments" that studies show few will read or understand,
companies have every opportunity to skew the clauses to
their own advantage. Even the rare consumer or employee
who reads and understands the clauses usually can't avoid
them because all the other industry companies are impos-
ing similar clauses.
Sometimes, companies try to use arbitration to gain bla-
tant advantage over consumers and employees-such as by
eliminating claims for punitive or compensatory damages,
shortening statutes of limitations, or imposing biased arbi-
trators. The Minnesota attorney general recently brought a
claim alleging that one provider, the National Arbitration
Forum, was actually owned in part by a company that also
owned the very debt collection companies that regularly
sued consumers in NAF arbitration. In settlement of this
claim, NAF has now ceased handling consumer arbitrations.
Sometimes, the skewing is less blatant but equally detrimen-
tal--like preventing "little guys" from bringing class action
when that would be the only economically feasible means of
presenting a small claim affecting numerous consumers.
In addition to adversely impacting individuals, man-
datory arbitration clauses may have a detrimental impact
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on the public. Such clauses
ensure that disputes will be
resolved behind closed doors, Q
rather than through public
precedent.
Theoretically, a company
could set up an even-handed
mandatory binding arbitra-
tion program. Some compa-
nies and many arbitrators do their best to give consumers
and employees justice, and sometimes they succeed. But
human nature and the profit motive ensure that many
companies will take advantage of the opportunity to use
mandatory arbitration to treat the "little guys" unfairly.
If unfairness or potential unfairness is the problem, what
is the solution? Some say courts already have the power to
knock out unfair clauses using standard contract doctrines
such as unconscionability. Yet, although courts have void-
ed some of the most blatantly unfair clauses, these case-by-
case reviews are insufficient to ensure justice. First, many
"little guys" will never attempt to challenge unfair clauses.
Many won't even realize a challenge could be possible.
Second, it is time-consuming and expensive for challengers
to meet their burden to prove unconscionability. Successful
challenges often take years, and more than $100,000 may
be needed to pay for discovery and experts. Third, many
unfair clauses have survived court challenge because the
law targets only the most blatantly unfair provisions.
State legislators and regulators have no ability to rein
in abusive arbitration practices. Numerous Supreme
Court decisions have held that state attempts at regula-
tion are preempted by the FAA. 2
Unless the Supreme Court chooses to reverse 20 years of
arbitration precedents, a highly unlikely short-term prospect,
federal legislation is needed to protect ordinary Americans
from mandatory arbitration. Note that other countries,
including members of the European Union, have ensured
that companies cannot use mandatory binding arbitration to
secure unfair advantage over consumers and employees. We
in the United States ought to protect ourselves as well.
Congress could protect Americans by enacting either
of two types of legislation: prohibitive or regulatory.
Prohibitive legislation, of which the proposed 2009
Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA) is an example, would
prohibit mandatory predispute arbitration altogether with
respect to consumers, employees, and civil rights claim-
ants. Regulatory legislation, on the other hand, would
eliminate only the most egregious forms of mandatory
arbitration, allowing companies to continue to mandate
arbitration for consumers and employees so long as it
meets minimal fairness requirements. For example, com-
panies might be barred from using biased arbitrators or
using arbitration to eliminate remedies available in court.
Upon reflection, there are two significant problems
with the seemingly reasonable regulatory approach. First,
how will unfair/impermissible arbitration practices be
defined? In the past, with providers' voluntary due process
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protocols, the definition of
unfair practices has proven
to be a moving target.
Just as one unfair practice
is restricted, companies
creatively devise another
unfair arbitration provision,
such as prohibiting all class
actions so as to insulate the
company from smaller claims. As long as companies have
the incentive and ability to define arbitration in a way
that is beneficial to them, attempts to regulate such prac-
tices may resemble that famous Dutch boy trying to put
his fingers in the holes in the dike. No sooner is one hole
blocked than another springs up.
Second, a regulatory approach is only as effective as
the regulator. How vigorously would a statute prohibit-
ing unfair arbitration practices be enforced? If the statute
requires individual "little guys" to prove particular arbitra-
tion clauses are unfair under the new federal law, they
will suffer the same high burdens of proof and expense
that they already face as they try to prove particular
arbitration clauses are unconscionable. Alternatively,
a new federal agency (such as the Consumer Financial
Protection Agency recently proposed by President
Obama) could be empowered to police all arbitration
clauses. But, as we have seen with other federal regula-
tory efforts in this country, inadequate funding will likely
cause enforcement to fall short of the aspiration.
The proposed AFA is a far preferable means to pro-
tect consumers, employees, and civil rights claimants.
Its direct prohibition on the imposition of mandatory
predispute arbitration in these settings would be simple
to enforce. The prohibition would protect persons who,
realistically, will not read or understand the meaning of
an arbitration provision prior to when a dispute has even
arisen. Yet, the statute would allow members of those
groups to voluntarily opt for binding arbitration on a
postdispute basis, thereby permitting disputants to select
arbitration over litigation once they can meaningfully
compare the costs and benefits of the two processes.
Some have criticized the AFA as overly broad in that it
would outlaw even predispute agreements that are entered
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. It is true that
a broad prohibition no doubt catches up at least a small
number of persons who could capably draft a predispute
arbitration agreement. However, it is better that this
statute be a bit overly broad than significantly overly nar-
row. It simply is not possible to draft a statute that would
perfectly distinguish between knowing consensual and
nonconsensual predispute arbitration agreements without
imposing impossibly high regulatory costs. To the extent
parties are precluded from entering enforceable predispute
arbitration agreements, they always have the option to
agree to arbitration postdispute. Although defenders of
mandatory arbitration typically assert postdispute agree-
ments are infeasible, both sides would have every incentive
to agree to a process that was truly better and more effi-
cient for all.
In the end, the most practical way to ensure that
arbitration is fair is to make it voluntary on a postdispute
basis. Once a dispute has arisen, consumers, employees,
and other "little guys" will be able to make knowledge-
able determinations as to whether the proposed arbitra-
tion is efficient and fair for all concerned. The proposed
Arbitration Fairness Act in this sense would use the free
market to ensure that arbitration is fair and just.
Point
(continued from page 4)
lawyers generally will demand high recoveries and a high
prospect of success before they are willing to undertake a
case. By contrast, the lower costs of arbitration and the
procedural flexibility enable an individual to obtain judg-
ment at a lower cost.
Apart from access to counsel, arbitration improves
access to justice in another respect. Individuals achieve
results faster. Every major empirical study on arbitration
has found that it produces results faster than litigation.
For individuals who seek recovery, the speed to resolution
may be a valuable advantage of this system of alternative
dispute resolution. By eliminating predispute arbitration,
Congress may worsen access to justice and end up hurting
the very classes of people whom it purports to protect.
For society as a whole, the costs of resolving disputes
without arbitration would rise. Consider the thousands of
disputes currently resolved by arbitration. If those disputes
no longer were arbitrable, where would they go? "To the
courts" is the obvious answer. But any self-respecting law-
yer or judge would tell us that the court dockets are already
overburdened. Shuttling these cases out of arbitration sim-
ply lengthens the line at the courthouse for everyone.
Some defenders of the Arbitration Fairness Act try
to turn these arguments on their head by arguing that
arbitration deprives plaintiffs of the ability to bring class
actions and thereby deprives those plaintiffs "access
to justice." There is some surface appeal to this argu-
ment, but it ultimately does not support adoption of the
Arbitration Fairness Act. For one thing, the argument
assumes the widespread adoption of class action waivers,
and although some evidence suggests its use in certain
industries (such as the cellular telephone industry), I am
unaware of any systemwide evidence on this point. For
another thing, even assuming the problem is widespread,
the argumient further assumes that a large number of cases
exist that would satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23's exacting standards-again, I am unaware of any
empirical evidence on this point. Finally, even assuming
that these two preceding hurdles can be overcome, the
argument does not support the wholesale invalidation of
arbitration clauses-a more calibrated solution would sim-
ply invalidate class action waivers but not the arbitration
Endnotes
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(May-June 1998) at 24.
2. E.g., Doctors Associates Inc v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (19 9 6)
(holding that the FAA preempted Montana law specifying that an arbi-
tration clause be printed at page one of a contract and be provided in
capital letters and underlined).
3. The currently pending bills, S. 931 and H.R. 1020, would also
prohibit franchisors from imposing mandatory arbitration on franchisees,
on the theory that many franchisees require protection from the more
powerful franchisors.
clauses themselves. Organizations such as the American
Arbitration Association have begun to develop extensive
experience administering class arbitrations, and there is
no principled reason why the purported benefits of a class
action cannot also be realized through the mechanism of
an arbitration. Thus, at bottom, the class action argument
is a bit of a ruse-at best it is an argument for the invali-
dation of class action waivers; at worst, it is self-interested
politicking by class action plaintiffs' lawyers masquerading
as policy making in the public interest.
Third, defenders of the Arbitration Fairness Act often
argue that postdispute arbitration mitigates these and other
risks of eliminating enforceable agreements. Yet postdispute
arbitration is not a viable alternative to predispute arbitra-
tion agreements. One problem is psychological-parties
are simply far more willing to agree on matters before a dis-
pute has arisen; once a dispute arises, the opportunities for
cooperation dwindle. The second problem is structural: the
parties' incentives in the postdispute context fundamen-
tally differ from the predispute context. Postdispute parties
have more information, which enables them to make more
calculated decisions regarding which form of dispute resolu-
tion better promotes their interests or effectively hinders
the individual's interests. Conversely, in the predispute
context, parties have an incentive to enter into arbitration.
An individual's incentive is that arbitration is an afford-
able forum with superior chances for a favorable result. A
company's incentive is that arbitration can lower the com-
pany's litigation costs.
At bottom, the Arbitration Fairness Act applies a meat
cleaver to an issue that requires a scalpel. The solution is not
for Congress to prohibit predispute arbitration agreements
in employment, consumer, and franchise contracts. Instead,
Congress should encourage and await additional empirical
research. Research may show minor additions to the regula-
tory repertoire are necessary. However, wholesale, retroac-
tive elimination of predispute arbitration agreements would
effectively make worse off the individuals whom Congress,
through this legislation, seeks to protect.
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